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The history of water law throughout the United States is dynamic. Beginning
with the inherited doctrine of English common law natural flow riparianism, the
changes in law can be described as instrumentalist in the sense that "judges and
legislatures made this branch of water law an instrument of pro-developmental
policy."' When the natural flow doctrine's requirement that the stream flow
down to lower owners undiminished as to quantity and quality 2 clashed with the
needs of the extensive utilization of water powered mills in the nineteenth
century, the courts pioneered an American doctrine of reasonable use riparianism
that would sustain water-dependent industrialization.3 Legislatures joined in as
well, passing the Mill Acts, which defused the threat of injunction against mills
whose ponds inundated portions of neighboring lands.4 Those laws effectively

Professor of Law, Florida A & M University College of Law. I would like to thank Jacqueline
Bertelsen, Florida A&M University College of Law, class of 2016, for her research assistance on
this article.
1.
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL
OF WATER RESOURCES 55 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEGAL CONTROL]. See also, Clyde Fisher,
Western Experience and Eastern Proposals, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN
UNITED STATES 75 (David Haber & Stephen W. Bergen eds.).
2.
For an early American example of the inherited natural flow doctrine, see Merritt v.

Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460, 463 (1795).
3.

Far and away the most frequently cited case for this proposition is Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24

F. Cas. 472, 473-74 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
4.

See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American

Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 248, 253 (1973).
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forbade injunctions for continuing trespass and substituted judicially determined
amounts of compensation in what can only be viewed as an early instrumentallydriven form of condemnation favoring a private use that allowed water to be
used in a manner that contributed to growth and prosperity.5
Indeed, practical re-ordering of law has been a necessary staple of American
water law. In the arid West, where the vast majority of lands were not adjacent
to the region's rivers and the diversion and transport of water was necessary to
support settlement for farming and ranching, Chief Justice Hallett of the
Colorado Territorial Supreme Court deliberately inverted the usual dominance of
a landowner to be free of rights of way across his or her parcel.6 What is more,
the result is inexorably correct as soon as the reader takes in the import of the
passage. Using water instrumentally is an obvious imperative: "In a dry and
thirsty land it is necessary to divert the waters of streams from their natural
channels, in order to obtain the fruits of the soil, and this necessity is so universal
and imperious that it claims recognition of the law."7
The passage went on to explain the contextual necessity of the altered legal
rule:
The value and usefulness of agricultural lands, in this territory,
depend upon the supply of water for irrigation, and this can only be
obtained by constructing artificial channels through which it may flow
over adjacent lands. ... [L]ands situated at a distance from a stream

cannot be irrigated without passing over intermediate lands, and thus all
tilled lands, wherever situated, are subject to the same necessity. In
other lands, where the rain falls upon the just and the unjust, this
necessity is unknown, and is not recognized by the law....
When the lands of this territory were derived from the general
government, they were subject to the law of nature, which holds them
barren until awakened to fertility by nourishing streams of water, and
the purchasers could have no benefit from the grant without the right to
irrigate them. It may be said, that all lands are held in subordination to
the dominant right of others, who must necessarily pass over them to
obtain a supply of water to irrigate their own lands, and this servitude
arises, not by grant, but by operation of law.

5.
See id
6.
See Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 554 (1872), superseded by statute, COLO. CONST.
Art. 2 § 14, as recognized in Stewart v. Stevens, 10 Colo. 440 (1887).
7. Id. at 553.
8. Id at 553, 555.
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West-wide, beyond the 100th meridian, virtually all states moved, at least in
part, to a system that either replaces or supplements riparianism with prior
appropnation.
The focus of the "Transitions" topic of this symposium, however, is the East.
Its emphasis is even narrower than the East as a whole, because the sponsoring
institution is the South CarolinaLaw Review, and the State of South Carolina in
2010 enacted a regulated riparianism statute.' 0 This Article attempts to locate
the South Carolina law in the gradual process of eastern states' water law
transformation. This effort exposes at least one major aspect of the new South
Carolina law that is both unusual, controversial, and potentially damaging to the
water resource future of the state."
South Carolina can hardly be described as a "dry and thirsty land." Rather it
is a part of the nation where an average of forty to fifty inches of precipitation
per annum 2 "falls on just and the unjust." The necessity for change in South
Carolina and the remainder of the East is not "so universal and imperious" as to
require total repudiation of the doctrine of reasonable use riparianism. Even so,
modem water resource conditions in the region are precarious. The majority of
eastern states have altered their water law to reduce or eliminate their adherence
to common law reasonable use riparianism in favor of more managerial systems
usually labelled "regulated riparianism." 3
As stated in the Preface to the American Society of Civil Engineers Model
Regulated Riparianism Water Code, the two words "regulated" and
"riparianism" emphasize that the common law is being replaced by an
administrative permit process, and that water is still being allocated using
riparian principles of reasonable use, as opposed to rules based on priority in
time or capture of the resource. 14 The change is more far-reaching as well. The
regulatory side requires anticipatory planning for low-flow scenarios and

9. See, e.g., LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 14. The unique experience in Oklahoma will
be discussed infra Part IV.
10. Act 247 of 2010 substantially amended Sections 49-4-10 to -180 of the 1976 S.C. Code
of Laws, renaming these sections as the South Carolina Surface Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use,
and Reporting Act. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-10 to -180 (Supp. 2014).
11. The agricultural provisions are, in general, unusual to the extent that they do not appear
to be subject to the normal permit system. See id. § 49-4-35. Perhaps more critical is the perpetual
right to automatic renewal of registered agricultural uses. See infra Part V.
12. See S.C. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., 1981-2010 Climate Normal Annual Precipitation,
http://www.dnr.sc.gov/climate/sco/ClimateData/Images/PANN.png (last visited on Feb. 25, 2015).
As one moves to the northwest, precipitation amounts are even more. Id.
13. WATER LAWS COMM., WATER RES. PLANNING & MGMT. DIV., AMERICAN Soc'Y OF
CIVIL ENG'RS, Preface to THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE v (Joseph W.

Dellapenna ed., 1997) [hereinafter ASCE Model Code]. The "riparian" label, however, overstates
the role of riparian location because the system in many states applies to both surface water and
groundwater and permits for use are not limited to lands that are riparian to a surface watercourse.
Id. §§ 2R-2-32 & -33.
14. Id. at v (citing Joseph Dellapenna, The Early Regulation of Riparian Rights, in 1 & 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 7th vol. 1991)).
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prospectively determines alterations in water use under those conditions. 5 The
permits to make use of the water are quantified by the regulator at the outset,
rather than determined reactively after a use has been initiated and challenged in
a lawsuit. The permits are temporally limited and the total permitted amount at
any one time cannot exceed a maximum amount set by the regulator with
reference to the public interest, which includes ecological needs for minimum
flows and levels.' 7 The most "un-riparian" aspects of regulated riparianism
discards riparian location as a determinant of the usufructuary rights being
granted, and in most states, but not in South Carolina- extend the reach of the
regulation to include groundwater.1
I.

THE LIMITATIONS OF REASONABLE USE RIPARIANISM AND THE NEED FOR
CHANGE19

Unlike the arid western states where repudiation of riparianism occurred
quickly on the heels of settlement or increased competition for use of limited
supplies,20 the East's generally adequate water supply in relation to demand for
its use forestalled discomfiture with riparianism until the middle of the twentieth
century. Advocacy attempting to explain the need for, and to describe the

15. Id. § 1R-1-05.
16. See id. at viii.
17. Id. § 1R-1-11.
18. Id. at viii.
19. A quarter of a century ago, this author wrote a series of three articles on this topic. A
mercifully shortened version of many of those ideas appears here, mostly without citation to that
material. See Robert H. Abrams, Chartingthe Course ofRiparianism:An Instrumentalist Theory of
Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989) [hereinafter Abrams, Instrumental Change]; Robert H.
Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Considering a Move
Away From Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255 (1990) [hereinafter Abrams, Water Allocation];
Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 93
(1990). The thesis of this trilogy was stated as follows:
[T]he problems of endemic water shortage are inescapable and are emphatically not ones
well addressed by riparianism alone. Rather, these problems are best solved through
government intervention and management of the water resources at issue. Government
action will most likely take the form of direct regulation of competing users, but in all
events, Eastern water law will be different as a result.
Abrams, Instrumental Change, at 1382.
20. Each state has its own history, but the states of the intermountain West all tended to
follow the so-called Colorado doctrine that immediately parted ways with riparianism and denied it
had ever been their law. See LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 14. The Pacific tier, since much of
the initial settlement was in the better watered areas, made the transition post-statehood early in the
twentieth century. See id. California retained a mixed system. Id. The 100th meridian tier, like the
Pacific tier, saw most of the change near the beginning of the twentieth century. Id. One of those
states, Oklahoma, has seen efforts to make a transition to prior appropriation, efforts which were
prevented by its supreme court's interpretations of riparian property rights and takings law. That
experience will be discussed infra Part IV.
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principles of, alternatives to riparianism began to surface in the 1950s.21

It is

arguable that the source of frustration with reasonable use riparianism was more
academic than instrumental, given the small number of localized water shortage
events. The intellectual frustration has some of its roots in the then-nascent law
and economics thinking that was finding its way into legal academia. The
criticism from that quarter, had it been explicit, would have gone something like
this:
Reasonable use riparianism, as a system of property rights relating to the
land and adjacent water, could function far more efficiently and
instrumentally permit the full utilization of the water resource if
riparianism was replaced by a system of water rights having legal rules
22
that provide a clear set of entitlements.
Even in the words of William Goldfarb, a water law scholar having a more
congenial attitude toward reasonable use riparianism in the East, the rights
created by the doctrine are "mud" rather than "crystals" and frustrate proactive
governance of the resource:
The riparian system favors flexibility over security. By and large it has
worked well in the humid, water-rich eastern states .

. .

.

Allocation

decisions in pure riparian states are made by the courts, an institution
lacking the expertise and administrative continuity to assure a
predictable diversion rights system.
Case-by-case judicial
decisionmaking results in inconsistent and impermanent results. Any
allocation may be altered by the entry of new users, changes in patterns
of use, or changes in the characteristics of the watercourse. This
absence
of definite,
quantifiable
diversion
rights
inhibits
investment.... [C]ourt decisions on water allocations are ad hoc
[and] ... [c]omprehensive record-keeping and water supply planning
are impossible in a pure riparian state.23

&

21. See, e.g., DAVID HABER, Introductory Essay, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN
THE EASTERN UNITED STATES xxv, xxvii-xxxii (David Haber & Stephen Bergen eds. 1957).
22. Cf Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 15 (1960)
(describing efficiency gains that are available in externalities trading regardless of the initial legal
entitlement as long as the rule of property rights is clear). See generally CHARLES J. MEYERS
RICHARD A. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET
IN WATER RESOURCES, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, LEGAL STUDY No. 418-25 (1971) (giving

&

examples of ways to use land and water more efficiently).
23. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 24-25 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Donna Downey
Stewart Sessions, Innovative Water Quality-Based Permitting: A Policy Perspective, 57 J. WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 358, 360 (1985); 1985-86 Marine Water Quality Comm., How
Stringent Should Marine Waivers From Secondary Treatment Be?, 58 J. WATER POLLUTION
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Two principal factors kept the need for reforms at bay. First, although
reasonable use riparianism did not make adequate provision for the secure rights
needed to support public water supply needs, municipalities and other public
water suppliers were early on granted adequate powers of condemnation to
24
support their operations and obtain whatever water they needed.
Second was
the old adage, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." 25

Even though the ad hoc,

unpredictable and reactive equitable nature of riparian rights case law was
potentially a problem,26 there were no more than a handful of reported cases of
conflicts among riparians where riparianism failed to provide an adequately
27
principled and predictable adjustment of competing uses.
In most cases,
adjustment of competing uses was possible simply because there was an
adequate supply of water to permit all uses to be continued, although some
would have to be reduced or adjusted as to their intensity so as to permit all of
21
the parties a reasonable share.
What finally upgraded the threat of serious water conflict in the East29 was
the possibility of broader water supply instability posed by population growth in
coastal regions and an increase in water demand for irrigation, which is an
extraordinarily high-volume and highly consumptive use of water. Exacerbating
the impact of both of those pressure points since the latter half of the twentieth

CONTROL FED'N 1101, 1103 (1986)). See also T. E. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L.
REv. 1, 12-15 (1970) (explaining the shortcomings of the riparian doctrine).
24.

LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 2, at 37, 100-32 (citations omitted).

&

25. See Abrams, InstrumentalChange, supranote 19, at 1389.
26. Common law riparianism is quintessentially reactive because the rights of the parties are
determined after the competing uses are established and one complains of the actions being taken by
the other.
27. See Abrams, Instrumental Change, supra note 19, at 1400-05 (citing Taylor v. Tampa
Coal, 46 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1950) (concerning a boating-irrigation conflict); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265
S.E.2d 584, 586 (Ga. 1980), clarified by Tunison v. Harper, 690 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. 2010) (concerning
a mill seat-irrigation conflict); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1977)). The leading
"problem" cases are discussed infra Part IV.
28. See, e.g., Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786, 789 (Conn. 1888) (stating that the riparian millowners have a right to their fair proportion and beneficial use of the stream, even if limited). No
doubt even under the amorphous contours of riparianism, some self-regulation occurred, too. A
riparian proprietor, knowing that the law demanded uses be reasonable in light of the correlative
rights of others, would not invest in uses that demanded the entire stream be diverted into another
watercourse or that consumptively used the entire flow to the detriment of downstream co-riparians.
29. There were some early moves to managerial permit systems, most notably Iowa and
Florida. In Iowa, Chapter 455A of the Iowa Code, was repealed and replaced in 1982 by Acts of
1982, ch. 1199, § 97. See IOWA CODE § 455A (1983). The repealed sections were later reenacted
with some changes in Chapter 455B of the Code of 1983. See IOWA CODE § 455B (2015). Those
provisions have, periodically, been amended further. Florida has the Florida Water Resources Act of
1973, which was codified at Chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 373 (2014). The
Florida regulatory system was based on a model code. See FRANK MALONEY, RICHARD AUSNESS
J. SCOTT MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE WITH COMMENTARY v (1972).
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century is an observable increase of extreme weather patterns that have emerged
as a manifestation of global warming.30
Water shortage problems in the East tend to be most acute in coastal
regions. 3' Those areas are faced with a multi-headed hydra: less access to
32
freshwater, high population growth, and adverse climate change impacts.
Consider the demands of population growth in terms of municipal water supply
and other larger volume uses, such as thermoelectric generation or irrigation.
The natural tidally-driven upstream movement of the salt front in rivers means
that surface water intakes must be located sufficiently far upstream to avoid the
risk of drawing salt water into the water supply system. 33 While sufficient water
may be available for importation from upstream in-basin or out-of-basin sources,
water importation projects are flashpoints for resistance and have proved very
difficult to accomplish.34 For that reason, in many coastal areas groundwater is
now (and in some of those areas has been) the preferred source of fresh water.35
With growth and population pressure, however, the risk of saline intrusion into
36
fresh water aquifers limits pumping.
Here, too, climate change is playing a
role. The upstream movement of the salt front is exacerbated by climate
change, 37 which is increasing sea level, causing more violent storm surges, and,
in times of drought, reducing freshwater out-flow. 38

The reactive and slow-

moving process of riparian rights litigation lacks the ability to support planned
responses to what seems to be inevitably repeating water shortages in growing
coastal areas.
Moving to irrigation, the potential for conflict with other water users should
be fairly clear. It is both a high-volume use and highly consumptive use of
water. The list of twentieth century cases that riparianism handled poorly is led

30. See Robert Abrams, Water, Climate Change, and the Law: Integrated Eastern States
Water Management Founded on a New Cooperative Federalism, 42 ENV'T L. REP. 10,433, 10,438
(2012) [hereinafter Abrams, New Cooperative Federalism];see also Abrams, Instrumental Change,
supra note 19, at 1409-18 (citations omitted) (discussing the climatic impact on precipitation and
water supply characteristics in Eastern states).
31. See LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 108.
32. See id. at 108-09.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 108-114 (citing State of North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261 (1990));
see also Robert Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
591, 621 (1983) (discussing effects of inhibiting interbasin diversion).
35. Paul M. Barlow, Ground Water in Freshwater-SaltwaterEnvironments of the Atlantic
Coast, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. CIRCULAR 1262 iii (2003), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2003
/circ1262/pdf/circl262.pdf.
36. Id.; see also, e.g., Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 737 (Ala. 1995) (finding
potential saltwater contamination of freshwater aquifer constitutes an irreparable injury).
37. See J. Christopher Walker et al., Impact of Global Climate Change on Urban
Infrastructure, in THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES
2-29, 2-31 (1989).
38. See Mark A. Ayers et al., Sensitivity of Water Resources in the Delaware River Basin to
Climate Variability and Change, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 2422, 32-33, 38
(1994).
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by three irrigation-prompted conflicts.39 To see how this plays out, imagine for a
moment smaller watercourses, and, now, superimpose the typical eastern state's
hydrograph. Most streams have their lowest levels of flow in mid-summer and
late summer. Similarly, as the summer progresses, most lakes experience
lowered lake levels due to reduced runoff and higher evaporation rates. When
potential irrigators are added to the picture the situation can spiral out of
historically adequate supply/demand balance. 40 For example, even a moderate
level of drought may force those farmers often able to succeed at dry land
farming to irrigate. 4' Along with summer drought comes summer heat, which
can increase the demand for electricity and, in tum, the amount of water needed
42
to cool thermoelectric generation units. The need to irrigate and cool escalates
during those key parts of the growing season that are already the low-flow time
of the year for the watercourse. 43 That intensifies their competition with any in
situ use, such as boating or recreation, which require not only that the water not
be consumed, but also that it be left in place or immediately returned to the
watercourse at or near the place of withdrawal.44 While there are not yet a skein
of new reported cases having these characteristics, encountering them while
common law riparianism holds sway would compromise the ability to respond
and helps explain calls for legislative action.

39. See Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980), overruled by Tunison v. Harper, 690
S.E.2d 819 (Ga. 2010) (involving a mill-seat irrigation conflict); Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129
(Ark. 1955) (involving a boating-irrigation conflict); Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
1950) (involving a boating-irrigation conflict).
40. See Joby Warrick, California's Drought Could Cause Massive Crop Failure, National
Ripple Effects, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (August 18, 2014), http://www.nhregister.com/generalnews/20140818/californias-drought-could-cause-massive-crop-failure-national-ripple-effects
(discussing effect of drought on demand for aquifers).
41. See, e.g., id. (discussing farmers changing their traditional methods during drought).
42.

See Nuclear Power and Water, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Dec. 2011),

http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/fileslegacy/assets/documents/nuclearpower/fact-sheet-wateruse.pdf. The heat effects on water supply tend to cascade. See id. Increased air conditioning
demands more thermoelectric generation, which in turn requires increased amounts of surface water
for cooling. See id. Some of that surface water is consumed in evaporation and that which is
returned is now warmer, which increases the evaporation rate from the surface watercourse itself
and reduces the cooling capacity of the water if it is reused or serves as source water for another
facility that needs cooling. See id.
43. Robert Abrams et al., Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon
Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 43 (2010).

44. All three of the prior cases cited raise this type of conflict. Incidentally, in the two older
cases, the irrigation use was deemed to have caused the conflict and was enjoined. See Harris, 283
S.W.2d at 135; Taylor, 46 So. 2d at 394. Pyle involved an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's
award of partial summary judgment to the in situ user on the grounds that the irrigation use was, in
effect, per se unreasonable. The Georgia Supreme Court overruled, holding that irrigation was a
reasonable (i.e., permissible) use under that state's common law of riparian rights, and remanded for
further consideration of whether, on the particular facts of the competing uses and the size of the
stream, etc., the irrigation use was reasonable or unreasonable. See Pyle, 265 S.E.2d at 589 (citing
Robert Clark Kates, Georgia Water Law, in INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT 35-36 (1969); Oostanaula

Mining Co. v. Miller, 88 S.E. 562 (Ga. 1916)).
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Certainly, such a scenario is possible in South Carolina. Irrigation can
reduce water supply quickly and once the critical competition between irrigation
and other uses begins, the potential for major conflict becomes strong. South
Carolina irrigation rates, by western-states' standards that run four to six times as
high, are quite modest, averaging only slightly less than one acre-foot per acre
per year.45 At that rate, the same amount of water typically used to irrigate a
single acre of crops through the growing season is enough to sustain the
46
domestic needs of about a dozen people for the entire year.
That number
overstates the tradeoff to a degree because roughly 50% of the irrigation water
withdrawn and applied becomes return flow that either finds its way back to the
stream or becomes recoverable groundwater.47 Even so, as depicted in the
scenario above, irrigation use has immense room to grow if climatic conditions
deteriorate. Making the summer irrigation scenario that much more dramatic,
the rate and timing of water demand of irrigation withdrawals, particularly in
regard to surface water sources,48 is of consequence. The ecological effects and
disruptions from other uses and major irrigation withdrawal at a low-flow time
of year will be far more significant than an identical volume withdrawn steadily
throughout the year or at a high-flow time of year.
Facts about water use patterns tend to bear out the predictions that irrigation
usage in the East is growing substantially. Importantly, the growth of irrigation
is already occurring at a time when the eastern states have experienced what
seems almost certain to be the leading edge of climate change impacts on water
supplies. 49 Until at least the second half of the twentieth century, irrigation in

45. Molly A. Maupin et al., Estimated Use of Water in the United States, U.S GEOLOGICAL
SURV. CIRCULAR 1405 26 (2010), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1405/pdf/circl405.pdf.
46. This calculation is based on a water duty of one acre-foot per acre. Id There are
approximately 325,851 gallons in an acre-foot of water. Id. at iv. The domestic use value used is
69.3 gallons per day per person. See PETER W. MAYER ET AL., AWWA RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
RESIDENTIAL END USES OF WATER 86 (1999).

47. See, e.g., Jerry E. Carr et al., National Water Summary 1987 Hydrologic Events and
Water Supply and Use, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 2350 137 (1987) (utilizing
a chart to depict this return flow scenario).
48. In aquifers that receive significant amounts of recharge, unless saline intrusion or aquifer
compaction problems arise, periods of summer overdraft (withdrawals in excess of recharge) can be
offset by periods of the year in which recharge exceeds withdrawals. See LEGAL CONTROL, supra
note 1, at 447, 450 (proffering a thumbnail description of this and other potential advantages of
groundwater).
49. See, e.g., LYNNE M. CARTER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES
396-407 (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo & Thomas C. Peterson eds., 2014) (citations omitted)
(discussing the impacts of climate change on the Southeast). Multiple sources indicate that most of
the southeastern United States will experience hotter, drier summers with more severe storms in the
fall and winter months. These models also indicate that the northeastern United States will
experience more severe storm events (and precipitation in general) in the winters and marked
increases in summer droughts and temperature. See Extreme Climate Predicted in Eastern U.S.:
Storms, Heat Waves
with Global Warming, SCIENCEDAILY
(Dec.
17, 2012),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/12/121217121732.htm; Climate Modelers Predict Warmer,
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the East operated on a far smaller scale of water use than is now the case. Using
South Carolina as an example, based on United States Geological Survey
(USGS) data, irrigation use of water more than tripled between 1955 and 2010,
from approximately 30,000 acre feet per year to more than 100,000 acre feet
per year. Using state data for 2006, the total irrigation use in South Carolina was
more than 114,000 acre-feet.5' The state itself notes one of the impacts of
climate change in its reporting, when it commented on a comparatively recent
and substantial increase in the number of acres being irrigated:
From 2002 to 2007, the number of farms using irrigation increased 6
percent from 1,918 to 2,030, and the area of irrigated farmland increased
38 percent from 95,642 acres to 132,439 acres (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2009). This notable increase in irrigation may be a result of
the severe drought that occurred from 1998-2002. Still, in 2007, only
52
about 9 percent of the harvested cropland was under irrigation.
This data is concerning-should droughts become more frequent or more
severe, 91% of South Carolina's farms are potential new entrants into the
irrigation user community that will add water demand for irrigation.53 As
discussed more fully later, the impetus to establish new or expanded irrigation
water use in South Carolina is greatly increased by the operation of the new
South Carolina statute, which richly rewards the winners of the race to the
diversion head gate, or pump house, by granting in perpetuity what amounts to
de facto priority-protected rights to water.54 Irrigation efficiency improvements,
if required under the permits, can be used to blunt a portion of the growth in
water quantity demand, but that requires political will to put requirements in
place, especially when the most efficient systems are correspondingly more

Wetter
Northeast
U.S.
Winters
by
2070,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Dec.
12,
2012),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/12/121212111331 .htm.
50. See Estimated Use of Water in the U.S., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. CIRCULAR 398 13
(1955); see also Maupin, supranote 45, at iv (depicting conversion table for acre-foot).
51. See LAND, WATER & CONSERVATION DIVISlON, SOUTH CAROLINA STATE WATER
ASSESSMENT, S.C. DEPT. OF NAT. RESOURCES 4-4 tbl.4.2 (Andrew Wachob et al. eds., 2d ed.
1999) [hereinafter Land, Water & Conservation], available at https://www.dnr.sc.gov/water/hydro
/HydroPubs/assessment/SCWACh_4.pdf. This total includes farm and golf course irrigation. Golf
course irrigation is approximately 30% of that total. Using an estimate that 30% of domestic and
municipal supply water is devoted to lawn and landscape irrigation of dwellings, public parks, other
public facilities, and roads, based on the 2005 USGS South Carolina data, the usage for all types of
irrigation triples. Id.; see also Maupin, supra note 45, at iv (depicting conversion table for acrefoot).
52. Land, Water & Conservation, supra note 51, at 4-13 (citing 2007 Census ofAgriculture,
1 GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERIES pt. 51, 378 (2009)).

5 3. Id.
54.

See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
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costly.5 5 Worse still, under the new South Carolina law, agricultural users are

subject to conservation requirements only if they opt into the permit system
rather than securing their water uses through participation in the largely
56
unregulated registration process.
To the extent there are other eastern states that have not moved away from
common law riparianism, it seems only a matter of time before they begin to
experience conflicts between irrigators and other surface users that are not
adequately addressed by their common law. If prior cases are indicative, those
states will find it difficult to establish predictable standards, and if cases continue
to arise, they, too, will move away from common law riparianism in an effort to
protect high valued interests such as municipal, ecology, and energy production
on a consistent basis.
The historical disjunction between surface water rights and groundwater
rights works in tandem with the shortcomings of riparianism. Although the two
water sources often are hydrologically linked, their legal governance has been
largely independent, creating an ongoing and poorly addressed potential for
competing entitlements to the same corpus of water.5 7 The move to managerial
systems permits the treatment of all waters in the state as being subject to the
permit system and allows the permitting agency to take the hydrologic
interconnections of groundwater and surface water into account.
II.

A CAMEO DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPICAL REGULATED RIPARIANISM SYSTEM

The breadth of promise of regulated riparianism can be grasped in the
opening section of the ASCE Model Code:
The waters of the State are a natural resource owned by the State in trust
for the public and subject to the State's sovereign power to plan,
regulate, and control the withdrawal and use of those waters, under law,
in order to protect the public health, safety, and welfare by promoting
economic growth, mitigating the harmful effects of drought, resolving
conflicts among competing water users, achieving balance between
consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of water, encouraging
conservation, preventing excessive degradation of natural environments,

55. In general, agricultural users as registrants and not permittees can avoid any and all
conservation requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
57. See, e.g., Peter N. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189,
193 (1972) (discussing the need for recognition of hydrologic connection in order for law to
function properly).
58. See, e.g., ASCE Model Code, supra note 13, §§ 2R-2-32 to -33 (defining "waters of the
state" and "water source").
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and enhancing the productivity of water-related activities.59
The section establishes state ownership of the water resource at the outset,
which is a not very subtle reminder to both past and future water users that their
property "rights" are merely usufructuary (rights of use).6o As a further
limitation on the extent of any claimed private rights, the state's ownership of the
corpus of water is itself subject to the public trust, which limits the ability of the
state to alienate the resource in contravention of its trust responsibilities.
The
Model Code's list of allowable purposes freely mixes both economic
development and environmental conservation and elsewhere offers greater
guidance on how the purposes are to be balanced in the traditionally hard cases
62
where a proposed use of water furthers one purpose at the expense of another.
By defining waters of the state to include both groundwater and surface
water, regulated riparianism sweeps out the troubling phenomenon of parallel
systems, which create competing entitlements based on the manner in which
water is withdrawn.63 This simple sweep of the pen overcomes two centuries of
ostrich-like jurisprudence, for at least half of which it was well known that
groundwater and surface water users often use water that is part of a unitary
hydrologic system. Once the method of withdrawal is deprived of legal
significance and regulated riparianism begins to pursue a series of beneficial
outcomes aimed at maximizing the value of the water to society, the situs of use
is relevant only instrumentally. Any land, riparian or not, might be able to
64
benefit from having water for use.
In a slightly more subtle manner, the
section's use of the phrase "the State's sovereign power to plan, regulate, and
control the withdrawal and use of those waters"65 uproots the ad hoc and reactive
nature of common law riparianism.
A total break from common law riparianism is avoided and the heritage of
riparianism persists in the standard used to decide what uses are to be rewarded
66
with permits.
The first of five listed standards for a permit requires that the
state agency administering the program make a determination that "the proposed
use is reasonable." The remaining four, all of which must be satisfied to obtain
a permit, are (1) maintenance of safe yield limits, (2) consistency with the
comprehensive plan and any emergency plans, (3) inclusion of reasonable
conservation measures, and (4) consistency with the water code and other
68
statutes pertaining to the use of water.
Principles taken from common law

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 1R-1-01.
Id.
See infra text accompanying note 100.
ASCE Model Code, supranote 13, § 6R-3-02.
See id. § 2R-2-32.
Id. § 2R-1-02.
Id § 1R-1-01.
See id. § 1R-1-02.
Id. § 6R-3-01(1)(a).
Id. § 6R-3-01(1)(b)-(e).
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riparianism are utilized to determine the crux of the matter, which is defining
what is reasonable:
§6R-3-02 Determining Whether a Use Is Reasonable
In determining whether a use is reasonable, the State Agency shall consider:
A. the number of persons using a water source and the object, extent, and
necessity of the proposed withdrawal and use and of other existing or
planned withdrawals and uses of water;
B. the supply potential of the water source in question, considering quantity,
quality, and reliability, including the safe yields of all hydrologically
interconnected water sources;
C. the economic and social importance of the proposed water use and other
existing or planned water uses sharing the water source;
D. the probable severity and duration of any injury caused or expected to be
caused to other lawful consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of water by
the proposed withdrawal and use under foreseeable conditions;
E. the probable effects of the proposed withdrawal and use on the public
interest in the waters of the State, including, but not limited to:
1.

general environmental, ecological, and aesthetic effects;

2.

sustainable development;

3.

domestic and municipal uses;

4.

recharge areas for underground water;

5.

waste assimilation capacity;

6.

other aspects of water quality; and

7.

wetlands and flood plains;

F.

whether the proposed use is planned in a fashion that will avoid or minimize
the waste of water;
G. any impacts on interstate or interbasin water uses;
H. the scheduled date the proposed withdrawal and use of water is to begin and
whether the projected time between the issuing of the permit and the
expected initiation of the withdrawal will unreasonably preclude other
possible uses of the water; and
I any other relevant factors. 69

69. Id. § 6R-3-02.
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Importantly, in addition to the multiple factors to be considered in
determining reasonableness, the Model Regulated Riparianism Water Code also
recognizes the need for each state to put its own stamp on priorities among uses
by having a section that sets preferences, beginning with human consumption,
followed by livestock and protecting crops and other economic interests that
would be damaged by denial of water. 0
The planning mechanism provision is one of the less glamorous changes
wrought by these laws. Especially in recent times, under the threat of climatealtered water flows, many states have engaged in water planning efforts. 7' The
difference in this instance is the integration of the planning with the permitting
of uses. As previously noted, permits must conform to the plan. In that regard
the plan is more than hortatory; 72 it is being actively implemented. Emergency
planning shortage provisions also are implemented and can take the form of
permit conditions that require special conservation or cessation of use in a
declared emergency. 73 The plan and the permits, thus, create prospective
predictability for water users-they can't know the weather in advance, but they
know how their usage will be affected under water shortage and water
emergency conditions.74
Finally, regulated riparianism has very important advantages over the other
well-known system of quantified water rights, prior appropriation. Under
regulated riparianism, water use permits are temporally limited, usually picking a
period that is sufficient to allow adequate time to justify and recoup the waterdependent investment.
The ASCE Code, for example, set an initial period of
up to 20 years for most uses and up to 50 years for major public water supply
projects.7 Upon permit expiration, renewals are allowed and given a degree of
preference over competing applications, if there is not sufficient water to fulfill
all applications.
The preference for existing uses in the ASCE Model Code is
as follows:
[R]enewals shall be favored over competing applications for new
withdrawals if the public interest is served equally by the competing
water uses after giving consideration to the prior investment pursuant to
a valid water right in related facilities as a factor in determining the

70. Id § 6R-3-04.
71. See infra Part III (discussing South Carolina's efforts in this area).
72. ASCE Model Code, supranote 13, § 6R-3-01 (outlining standards for a permit).
73. Id §§ 7R-3-02 to -03.
74. See id § 7R-3-06 (establishing a framework for earning conservation credits and trading
them in water shortage situations).
75. Id § 7R-3-01 (establishing that restrictions apply for the duration of water shortage or the
water emergency).
76. Id § 7R-1-02.
77. Id § 6R-3-04(4).
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public interest.78
What emerges, hopefully, is a complete system that is planned, managed,
and effective at obtaining a well-orchestrated spectrum of benefits from the
water resource. 79 By limiting terms of permits and adding direction as to how
the many factors that make up the determination of reasonableness are to be
weighed, 0 the end result aims for a system that is proactive, predictable, and not
ossified.
III. LOOKING AT SOUTH CAROLINA'S ACT 247 OF 2010: A CRITIQUE OF
UNUSUAL PROVISIONS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTE

A. The Law and its PrincipalStandard
Act 247 of 2010 substantially amended South Carolina's water law and
renamed the governing provisions as the "South Carolina Surface Water
Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act." 8 ' While the facial application
of the statute to surface water alone does not appear to be as comprehensive as
the models for regulated riparianism, based on the state data, groundwater
accounts for less than one-half of one percent of all withdrawals.82 The statute
makes the locational break with riparianism because permits are to be issued
without regard to place of use. 83 With a significant exception for agricultural
use,84 the statute requires all surface water withdrawals in excess of 3 million
gallons per month to have permits.
The South Carolina statute is administered by the Department of Health and
Environmental Control ("Department") and has standards based on reasonable

7 8. Id.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., id. § 6R-4-03 (addressing how to evaluate allocations for their effect on water
quality).
81. The new statute appears in codified form at Title 49, Chapter 4 of the South Carolina
Code of Laws. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-10 to -180 (Supp. 2014).
82. Land, Water & Conservation, supra note 51, at 4-4 tbl.4.2 (noting statewide water use
from ground-water sources totaled 91,401 million gallons [0.4 percent] in 2006).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-60.
84. Id. § 49-4-30(3).
85. The definition of a "surface water withdrawer" adopts three million gallons per month as
its measure. Id. § 49-4-20(28). The statute also has a second category of below-threshold uses.
"Minimal changes in water quantity," involve withdrawals that return 90% of the water whose
consumption is less than 3 million gallons in any month and does not significantly reduce safe yield
at the point of diversion. Id. § 49-4-20(13). Those users are then drawn into the definition of
"nonconsumptive use," per Section 49-4-20(16), and upon proper application, the department shall
issue a permit. Id. § 49-4-40(A). There also are other exemptions from the permitting which, other
than the agricultural uses, do not appear to threaten major gaps in the statute's coverage of water
uses that significantly deplete stream flows. See id. § 49-4-30 (establishing exemptions for water
withdrawals).
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use riparianism for the issuance of permits that are similar to those of the Model
Code set out above. Section 49-4-80(B) provides:
To determine whether an applicant's proposed use is reasonable, the
department must consider the following criteria:
1. the minimum instream flow or minimum water level and the safe
yield for the surface water source at the location of the proposed
surface water withdrawal;
2. the anticipated effect of the applicant's proposed use on existing
users of the same surface water source including, but not limited to,
present agricultural, municipal, industrial, electrical generation, and
instream users;
3. the reasonably foreseeable future need for the surface water
including, but not limited to, reasonably foreseeable agricultural,
municipal, industrial, electrical generation, and instream uses;
4. whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the applicant's proposed
withdrawals would result in a significant, detrimental impact on
navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, or recreation;
5. the applicant's reasonably foreseeable future water needs from that
surface water;
6. the beneficial impact on the State and its political subdivisions from
a proposed withdrawal;
7. the impact of applicable industry standards on the efficient use of
water, if followed by the applicant;
8. the anticipated effect of the applicant's proposed use on the
following if the permit is granted:
a. interstate and intrastate water use;
b. public health and welfare;
c. economic development and the economy of the State; and
d. applicable federal laws and interstate agreements and compacts;
and
9. any other reasonable criteria that the department promulgates by
regulation that it considers necessary to make a final
determination.

7

The permit factors cover virtually all of the bases-resource conservation
and stewardship (factors 1 and 4), correlative uses present and anticipated
(factors 2 and 3), the public interest broadly conceived (factors 6 and 8), matters
specific to the user or use (factors 5 and 7), and all administratively determined
standards (factor 9).8

86.
87.
88.

Id § 49-4-25.
Id § 49-4-80(B).
See id.
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IV. TRANSITION FROM COMMON LAW RIPARIANISM AND TAKINGS OF PROPERTY

The transition from common law riparianism to the statutory regime is
important and potentially controversial. The importance is twofold legal and
political. Legally, because the change to regulated riparianism affects an aspect
of riparian proprietors' state law property rights, the change must be reviewed
for determination of whether it violates the due process guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.89
Politically, because riparian owners are an important segment of the population,
a political firestorm may be triggered by a substantial change in their rights.
The most common mode of easing the disruption that might otherwise
accompany the transition from common law riparianism to a permit system is to
grant initial permits for all existing uses being made by riparian proprietors.90
Doing so would ensure that no present water uses of riparians are terminated
and, because the typical term of an initial permit is twenty years, 91 any negative
impacts on the water use would be quite remote. In other areas, such as zoning,
amortization of nonconforming uses that allows them to be continued for a
number of years-often far less than twenty years-has blunted claims of
unconstitutional takings of property.92
The most vexing problem relates to the fate of those landowners holding
unexercised riparian rights, which would allow future use of the water on a
reasonable basis where the reasonableness is measured correlatively to the rights
of co-riparians and other water uses allowed in the jurisdiction.93 Existing users
are assured of permits on transition, but unexercised rights have no such
guarantee. 94 Those riparians, like all other would-be water users, are free to
apply for a permit. 95 Thus, it would seem that riparians with the pre-existing
common law "right" to initiate a use shared with other riparians have lost the
guaranteed right to entry into the class of water users in trade for a contingent
right shared with all other applicants. The difference between these two
positions is not as great as the statement of them makes it sound. As a coriparian under the common law, all uses, present and proposed, are allowed to go
forward only so long as they are "reasonable," as defined by the common law of
96
the state in relation to all other uses then being made.
Even a current water-

89.

S.C. CONST. art. I,

§

13(A) (2009 & Supp. 2014). Under the doctrine of selective

incorporation, that Fifth Amendment guarantee is applicable to the several states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Almost all states have their own state constitutional counterpart to the
United States Constitution.

90.
91.
92.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-70(B).
ASCE Model Code, supranote 13, § 7R-1-02.
See, e.g., Village of Skokie v. Walton. 456 N.E.2d 293, 297 (Ill. App. 1983) (stating

seven year amortization period is a valid constitutional exercise to regulate and ban signs).

93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-80(B).
94. Id. § 49-4-70(B).
95. Id. § 49-4-70.
96. Id. § 49-4-25.
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using riparian could see that use reduced (i.e., be determined no longer
reasonable) if there are additional demands for the water. 97 Thus, the riparian
that seeks to initiate a use pursuant to the permit system is being held to a
standard that is quite similar 98 -the use must be found "reasonable" as defined
by the statute in relation to all other uses then being made. 99
The already weak takings claim faces other strong counter arguments. In the
riparianism context, it is very important to remember that the riparian's land
holdings are unaffected and many incidents of riparianism remain intact-for
example, the right to wharf out, or the rights related to use of the water surface
for navigation and recreation. 00 Additionally, the corpus of the water does not
belong to the riparian ab initio.10 1 The water is owned by the state in trust for the
people.102 The riparian had only a usufructuary interest that was granted by the
state and that interest was enjoyed subject to the state's ability to alter, modify,
or eliminate the use in its trust-mandated governance of the resource for the
benefit of the people.103
A quasi-empirical look at the takings issue when states replace riparianism
with either prior appropriation or a permit-based system shows that only a small
minority of states encountered significant judicial resistance to approving the
transition.104 Because current and some historic riparian rights are converted to
the new system on transition, the primary legal concern is the abolition of the
"right" of a riparian to initiate a new use without perfecting it in the new
system.105 California is deemed to maintain a mixed system of common law
riparianism and legislatively introduced prior appropriation, but the courts have
permitted the de facto subordination of unexercised riparian rights to established
appropriations.106 In Oklahoma, the judiciary has rebuffed several legislative

97. See id. § 49-4-80.
98. Id. § 49-4-70(A).
99. Id. § 49-4-80(B).
100. These remaining uses substantially undercut takings claims because the remaining value
of the entire parcel to the riparian is almost always considerable and would, accordingly, pass
muster under the tests announced by Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
130-31 (1978), and would not qualify as a wipeout under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992) (citations omitted).
101. See LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 680 (citing Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct.,
658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983) (finding that
the public trust was not negated by a prior appropriation, even by the "public" or the state; however,
the public trust could not automatically foreclose the right of the Department of Water and Power
for the City of Los Angeles diversions).
105. ASCE Model Code, supranote 12, at iv-ix.
106. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 663 (Cal. 1979). The
State Water Resources Control Board once tried to eliminate unexercised riparian rights and was in
part rebuffed by the state's high court. Unexercised riparian rights, however, survived that decision
in a far more precarious position in which they could be placed at the bottom of the then-current
priority list when exercised. Id at 668-69.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss3/4

18

Abrams: Water Law Transitions
2015]

615

WATER LAW TRANSITIONS

efforts at change. 0 7 Although it is the outlier, the reasoning of the Oklahoma
court should be mentioned.
The Oklahoma statute limited riparians' future uses that could be initiated on
the basis of their riparian status to domestic use only.'0o Relying on article 2,
section 24 of the Oklahoma constitution's prohibition against takings of
property,1 09 the court majority described the nature of the Oklahoma property
rights as including "easements, personal property, and every valuable interest
which can be enjoyed and recognizedas property.""1 0 The majority then stated:

"

"A 'vested right' is the power to do certain actions or possess
certain things lawfully, and is substantially a property right. It may be
created by common law, by statute or by contract. Once created, it
becomes absolute, and is protected from legislative invasion ....
Therefore, the common-law riparian right to use stream water, as
long as that use is reasonable, has been long recognized in Oklahoma
law as a private property right."'
The striking feature of that passage is the inclusion of the word "absolute,"
which allows the Franco-American majority to transform a right that is
correlative and always contingent upon the state of competing uses of water at
the time a use is sought to be made into a "stick in the bundle" of property
rights112 which is so central to the bundle that it must be held inviolate. The
dissent criticizes this position by first affirming the power of each state over its
waters, quoting Justice Holmes famous defense of comprehensive state authority
over the state's waters,1' and then characterizing what the majority has created
as "the ability to demand a reasonable use of the stream in the future
(unencumbered by compliance with our State's water laws) under common law

107. Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 582 (1990).
108. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60(A) (2014).
109. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24. The Franco-American court cites only Oklahoma cases in
this regard, but the distinctive parts of its analysis lie in the definition of the nature of the riparian
right, not the state's constitutional provision. See Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 576 (quoting
Graham v. City of Duncan, 354 P.2d 458, 461 (Okla. 1960)).
110. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 576 (quoting Graham, 354 P.2d at 461) (emphasis in
original).
111. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 576 (quoting Okla. Water Res. Bd. v. Cent. Okla. Master
Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d 748, 755 (1968)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 589-90 (Lavender, J., dissenting) (quoting Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908)). The aspect of Hudson that had relied on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519 (1896), to immunize state water regulation beyond the limitations of the Dormant Commerce
Clause was later limited by Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). That change in law,
however, in no way limited the intramural authority of the state over its waters.
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or judicially imposed factors that courts over the years had utilized to decide
piecemeal disputes involving riparians or their privies.""14
In a modem era that demands careful water regulation, according so much
inviolate independence to initiate new riparian water uses free of regulation has
been rejected by all other states that have addressed the issue. 115
V. THE UNUSUAL TREATMENT OF AGRICULTURAL USE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST

The South Carolina statute separates and treats agricultural use differently
than many other uses under a registration program.
As a result, agricultural
users who opt for the registration program"'7 do not become "permittees,"" 8 and
thus, are not subject to the same standards as the permit program:119 "Registered
surface water withdrawers must register their surface water use with the
department on forms provided by the department and are subject only to the

reporting requirements of Section 49-4-50.
Registered surface water
withdrawers are authorized to withdraw surface water up to their registered
amount."120 Note also that the final sentence of that subsection grants carte
blanche to withdraw the entire registered amount subject to no regulatory
limitations other than the registration itself.121
Those reporting requirements are effectively ministerial rather than
substantive, calling for use of a statutorily recognized method of measurement of
the quantity withdrawn or the rated capacity of the equipment.122 Initial

114. Franco-American,855 P.2d at 590 (Lavender, J., dissenting).
115. The FrancoAmerican dissent reviews several precedents from other states that undercut
the majority. Id. at 590-91 (Lavender, J., dissenting) (citing Water of Hallet Creek Stream Sys., 749
P.2d 324, 336-38 (1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988); United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,
339 U.S. 725 (1950); Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 176 N.W.2d 239 (S.D. 1970), after
remand, 204 N.W.2d 105 (1973); In re Adjud'n of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe River
Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)). Of special
importance is the discussion of California's limitation of riparian rights because of the heavy
reliance that the majority places (erroneously) on California's choice to continue to give its riparian
rights preference over appropriative rights. See supra Part IV.
116. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-20(21), (23) (Supp. 2014) (defining public water system uses
compared to registered surface water withdrawer for agricultural uses).
117. Agricultural users may obtain permits. See id. § 49-4-55(A); see also id § 49-4-35(F)
(qualifying surface water withdrawers for permits).
118. See id. § 49-4-20(19).
119. This is done through a series of elements in the statute that begins with a broad definition
of agricultural use and agricultural facility. See id. § 49-4-20(2), (3). Section 49-4-20(23) then
creates a class of "Registered surface water withdrawer" that includes "surface water withdrawals
for agricultural uses at an agricultural facility." Registration has its privileges, as discussed infra at
Section V. See generally id. § 49-4-35 (outlining registration of surface water user).
120. Id. § 49-4-35(A).
121. Id. A separate provision does provide a sanction for withdrawals "substantially" in excess
of the registered amount. See id. § 49-4-35(E). In such cases, the Department "may" take action if,
in addition to the excess it also finds "the withdrawals result in detrimental effects to the
environment or human health." Id.
122. Id. § 49-4-50(A), (B).
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registrations at the outset of the program were generous to a fault, offering those
registrants the option of their largest historic amount withdrawn or the amount
corresponding to the maximum capacity of their equipment:
An existing registered surface water withdrawer already reporting its
withdrawals to the department as of January 1, 2011, may maintain its
withdrawals at its highest reported level or at the design capacity of the
intake structure which will be permanent as of January 1, 2011, and is
deemed to be registered with the department.123
New would-be registrants face a single standard for obtaining registrationthe anticipated surface water withdrawal must be "within the safe yield for that
water source at the time of the request."1 24 "Safe yield" is defined, essentially, as
everything in excess of the Department of Health and Environmental Control's
calculated minimum level or flow, including both natural and supplemental
sources.125 By fixing the registered amount with reference to the conditions
existing at the time of registration, any future risk of a decreased flow regime or
falling levels (due to climatic events or otherwise) is borne by permittees whose
permits may be conditioned on cutting back in times of low flow,126 and/or the

citizens of the state who may suffer as a result of levels or flows less than the
recognized minimum.
Other than small domestic users, whose rights are absolutely protected in
American jurisdictions, the literal termsl27 of the South Carolina Surface Water
Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act grant to South Carolina's
agricultural users the most absolute water use rights of any user class under any
water law currently recognized in the United States! Prior appropriation is a
good first point of comparison.
In the American West, prior appropriation was structured to provide secure,
ongoing water rights for transporting water from streams to the point of use, with
the support of irrigated agricultural being singularly important to the settlement
of the region.128 To obtain a water use right under prior appropriation, all states,
other than Colorado,129 have a state official, usually the state engineer, to whom

123. Id. § 49-4-35(B).
124. Id. § 49-4-35(C).

125. Id. § 49-4-20(25).
126. See id. § 49-4-100(A)(6), (7), (9) (indicating that permits are expressly to be conditioned
and reduced on change in flows or levels in response to the South Carolina Drought Response Act).
The statute does not impose similar limitations on registrations.
127. The law leaves almost no discretion available to the Department in relation to
registrations. Thus, a facial reading of the law and its practical application appear highly likely to be
identical.
128. LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 169, 171.
129. Colorado imposes requirements even more stringent in many cases than those described
in the text, but Colorado administers its water rights via a specialized system of water courts that, in
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application must be made before initiating a withdrawal of the water. 30 The
criteria for obtaining an appropriation include, among other things, a
determination that the use is beneficial and a determination that there is
unappropriated water available from which the appropriation may be satisfied.' 3
The water rights of appropriators are temporally strong in the sense that, once
obtained, they are perpetual rights unless modified or lost.132

The registered

withdrawals under the South Carolina law are effectively perpetual and subject
to neither loss nor modification. 3 3 Within the South Carolina system,
registrations are superior to permits in regard to duration. Whereas permits
expire,

34

registrations have no stated temporal limits.

35

The terms in the law

describe registration amounts as being "permanent,"1 36 and registrants are
allowed to make those same withdrawals in "subsequent years."137
On the beneficial and security prongs, the South Carolina law is even more
generous to agricultural use compared to prior appropriation law. Agricultural
use is an economically important use that is universally deemed beneficial as a
general matter,1 38 but the South Carolina law does not leave any room for state
scrutiny of the manner in which it is carried on. In contrast, most prior
appropriation states would insist, at a minimum, that the use be made in a nonwasteful manner, which both promotes efficient water use and threatens a
reduction of use in the event that older irrigation methods become sufficiently
outmoded as to be reduced for waste.1 39 In contrast, the South Carolina
registration system makes virtually any form of agricultural use eligible for
registration; the act of registration automatically results in a right to withdraw the
maximum amount of water the equipment and design of the facilities can
carry.1 40 In that regard, the state forfeits a check on agricultural inefficiency,
which in water-short times could reduce agricultural withdrawals by as much as
65% or even 90%.141 The prior appropriation doctrine also includes doctrines of

effect, conduct an ongoing adjudication of rights. See generally LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at
190-99 (providing an overview of the Colorado prior appropriation doctrine).
130. Id. at 172-73 & n.14.
131. Id. at 169-70.
132. Id. at 170. The principal grounds for modification and loss are discussed infra at Part V.
133. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-35 (Supp. 2014).
134. Id. § 49-4-100(A)(8).
135. See id. § 49-4-35(B).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 49-4-35(C).
138. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3; TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.002 (2013)
(providing an example of the fact that many States explicitly list agricultural use under the
definition of beneficial use in their constitutions and statutes).
139. See, e.g., State Dep't. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1050-52 (1993) (citations
omitted) (discussing the efficiency, usage, and water duty in prior appropriation).
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-35 (Supp. 2014).
141. Terry Howell, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., IRRIGATION EFFICIENCY, ENCYC. OF WATER SC.

467, 468 tbl.1 (2003), available at http://www.cprl.ars.usda.gov/pdfs/Howell-Irrig%20EfficiencyEncy/o20Water%20Sci.pdf.
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abandonment and forfeiture that require a user to regularly use the water
allocated by the appropriative right.142 In contrast, the South Carolina law has
no similar limit on registrations1 43 and thereby forfeits an important control on
water speculation. There is no requirement in the South Carolina statute that a
144
registrant must put the water to beneficial use.
Thus, for example, an
agricultural registrant can tie up the water without using it by investing in a
delivery system of considerable capacity, a move that under the terms of the
statute might block the issuance of permits for the water subject to
registration.1 45 Even if the Department concludes a permit should be issued for
unused registered water, the registration itself casts a cloud over the rights of the
permittee and deters investment. Permittees and not registrants are at risk of use
reductions needed to ensure minimum flows and levels are maintained.1 46
For post-2010 registrations, the "safe yield" protection of the South Carolina
law is similar to prior appropriation's unappropriated water requirement when it
is combined, as it typically is, with a public interest criterion.1 47 South Carolina
reserves some water from registration (or permitting) based on minimum levels
and flows and implements that protection under the "safe yield" requirement,
which applies to newly initiated registrations.1 48 The unappropriated water
requirement of prior appropriation historically was a bit cruder, considering only
whether there was water that was not already appropriated by others.1 49 In
modem times, however, prior appropriation states routinely require protection of
minimum levels and flows by insisting that appropriations are consistent with the
public interest, which includes level and flow protection under the public interest
umbrella of protections of the state's waters.1 50
The waters that are governed by the South Carolina Surface Water
Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act include "all water that is wholly
or partially within the State, including the Savannah River, or within its

142. LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 1, at 356.
143. As noted previously, the only post-registration limitation on registrants that is evident on
the face of the statute is Section 49-4-35(E), which addresses significant overuse as a ground for
possible modification of a registration, but is silent as to underuse or non-use. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 49-4-35(E).
144. See id. § 49-4-25 (requiring reasonable use but not beneficial use).
145. See id. §49-4-80(B).
146. See id. § 49-4-80(B), (J).
147. See id. § 49-4-35(C).
148. See id.
149. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (stating that maintaining minimum level and flow
protection is in the public interest); ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b)(3) (necessitating other
requirements pertinent to public interest). See also Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985)
(stating that "[t]hose applying for permits and those challenging the application bear the burden of
demonstrating which elements of the public interest are impacted and to what degree").
A full reading of the cited Alaska statutory public interest statute further highlights the lack of
comparative evaluation given to registration under the South Carolina statute and what is now the
norm in both prior appropriation states and in states following more conventional forms of regulated
riparianism. See ASCE Model Code, supranote 13, at v.
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jurisdiction, which is open to the atmosphere and subject to surface runoff,
including, but not limited to, lakes, streams, ponds, rivers, creeks, runs, springs,
and reservoirs," with exceptions for certain wastewater and other storage
impoundments.' 5
Given their prominence and importance to the state, the
waters themselves are public trust resources of the state.152
Most South Carolina public trust case law concerns public rights of access
and navigation.1 53 In those cases the South Carolina Supreme Court has
recognized public trust claims and the duty of the state to maintain control of
public trust resources.1 54 Looking at potential harm to navigation in isolation,
agricultural uses registered before the end of 2010 could totally dewater surface
streams and lakes.15 5 Post-2010 agricultural uses could reduce flows to the state
set minima, 15 which in some cases might be insufficient to protect public trust
navigational interests.
The real thrust of the public trust doctrine in this case, however, is the loss of
the state's ability to protect the public interest in the surface water resource. The
totemic case of Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois15 7 could hardly be more on point. In
that case, the Illinois legislature granted the submerged lands fronting Chicago's
entire commercial waterfront to the railroad company, thereby losing the ability
to govern the resource. 58 Justice Field's majority opinion makes the distinction
between acceptable grants of private rights in the use of trust resources and
grants that are impermissible abdications of the trust responsibility:
It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford
foundation for wharves, piers, docks and other structures in aid of
commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not
substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged
cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust
to the public upon which such lands are held by the State. But that is a
very different doctrine from the one which would sanction the
abdication of the general control of the State over lands under the

151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-20(27) (Supp. 2014).
152. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classificationsof States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.
REv. 1, 98-99 (2007) (citations omitted) (for a synopsis of South Carolina trust case law).
153. See id
154. See Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 128, 456 S.E.2d 397, 402
(1995). See,also McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20
(2003 (reciting exclusive right of public control over tidelands below the high water mark), Port
Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 524, 9 S.E. 686, 689 (1889)) (holding state controls land
below high water mark for public benefit to prohibit activity that impairs public interest).
155. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-35(A), (B) (Supp. 2014) (providing water
withdrawal requirements post-2011).
156. See id § 49-4-80(B).
157. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
158. Id. at 439-40.
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navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such
abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires
the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the
public. The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can
only be discharged by the management and control of property in which
the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the
property. The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never
be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests
of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.159
Turning that concept upon Act 247, another of the statements of Justice
Field, with the simple excision of the words "the lands under," is applicable: "A
grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been
adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind
would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation."160
Even though registration of surface water users sounds far short of a grant of the
water, the inability of the state to subsequently control the surface water resource
is the functional equivalent of "disposal" of the resource, which is forbidden by
South Carolina law.
Properly understood through the lens of the statute, the
degree of abdication of state authority here is greater than that ceded by the
Illinois legislature in Illinois Central.162
This public trust conclusion indirectly bolsters the claim of riparians that the
new statute has taken their common law correlative rights to initiate new uses.
In this regard, the comparatively unregulated ability of agricultural users to
register uses lends added importance to the statute's permit/registration defense
against potential claims by riparians:
Surface water withdrawals made by permitted or registered surface
water withdrawers shall be presumed to be reasonable. No private cause
of action for damages arising directly from a surface water withdrawal
by a permitted or registered surface water withdrawer may be
maintained unless the plaintiff can show a violation of a valid permit or

159. Id. at 452-53.
160. Id at 453.
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-25 (Supp. 2014); see also McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n,
354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20 (2003) (citing Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs.,
318 S.C. 119, 128, 456 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1995); Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519,
524, 9 S.E. 686, 689 (1889)) (holding state controls land below high water mark for public benefit
to prohibit activity that impairs public interest).
162. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-35(C), with Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-53
(demonstrating the degree to which South Carolina abandons its authority).
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registration.

Riparians cannot compete for legal recognition of their uses; they simply lose to
agricultural registrants.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal conclusion of this Article is that the South Carolina Surface
Water Withdrawal, Permitting, Use, and Reporting Act is badly flawed because
it includes agricultural users in an almost totally uncontrolled registration
track.164 That single choice effectively puts almost 90% of the state's water use
Precedents such as Illinois
beyond meaningful present or future regulation.
Central suggest that this aspect of the statute is a clear violation of the public
trust. It is also bad policy. In an era of potentially escalating water challenges,
the state needs to have a means to ensure its future ability to address the ongoing
governance of its waters. This particular enactment denies the state that ability
and could even harm many of the agricultural users it appears to benefit. A
small number of high capacity registrants could monopolize the state's water
supply and force other users, such as smaller farmers, municipalities, and
industries, to pay forms of tribute.166
The remedy for the most egregious failing of the statute is simple-require
agricultural users to participate in the permit system. The more quickly this is
done, the better. Quick action blunts potential claims by registrants who may
assert that their property rights have become the subject of investment-backed
expectations for which the state must pay compensation. 1
A second
concomitant of regaining prospective regulatory flexibility for the state is to
weaken the presumptions in favor of existing permits on renewal. 1 The state

163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-110(B). A lawsuit by riparians raising both the public trust and
takings arguments is currently pending in the Barnwell County Court of Common Pleas. See Jowers
v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, No. 2014-CP-06-322 (Sept. 4, 2014).
164. The failure of the statute to include groundwater should be corrected. It is not a matter of
great present concern because of the heavy predominance of surface water use in South Carolina.
Over time, that balance may change.
165. See Land, Water & Conservation, supra note 51, at 4-4 & tbl.4.2.
166. A registered high capacity agricultural diverter who is physically able to make a lowvalue, highly-consumptive use (such as flood irrigation of a forage crop) could effectively require
high-value downstream users to buy forbearance. Under the statute as enacted, South Carolina is
powerless to prevent that result. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-4-110(B).
167. Being able to state a valid takings claim for a requirement that a registration be converted
into a permit seems highly unlikely. See supra Part IV. In Illinois Central, the only compensation
the railroad received when the original grant was held to have been effectively rescinded by
subsequent legislation was compensation for actual improvements made to which title was quieted
in the state. 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
168. For an example of how a weaker presumption for undiminished renewals allows ongoing
managerial authority to protect the resource, permit new entrants, and allow the water to move to
higher uses, or fighter conservation standards, see Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So.2d 1324, 1328

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss3/4

26

Abrams: Water Law Transitions
2015]

WATER LAW TRANSITIONS

623

needs to be better able to balance the security interest of current water users, who
deserve some degree of recognition of the value of continuity of their use, with
the interest of its other citizens in being able to initiate new uses that allow
innovation and growth.
There is one important aspect of the South Carolina law on which it is too
soon to comment until its implementation by the Department of Health and
Environmental Control is more fully in view. The Department must set
minimum levels and flows to protect "biological, chemical, and physical
integrity" of streams and impoundments.169 Presumably, such levels will protect
all ecological, recreational, and aesthetic values of importance. Although the
minimum in-stream flow definition section references percentages of mean
annual flows as a determinant of monthly minima, experience in other states
indicates that the process is contentious and the longer it is delayed the more
likely it is that permits will be issued that are not adequately protective of the
public values of water in place.1 7 0
A final concern about Act 247 is its very modest planning component. The
Act does call for water shortage contingency plans, but these are required only of
permittees171 and are not part of a larger coordinated shortage plan. To a degree,
the lack of a larger scale plan is offset by the presence of the South Carolina
That law grants a different state agency, the
Drought Response Act.172
Department of Natural Resources,1 73 authority to promulgate regulations that
would require "non-essential" water uses curtailed upon declaration of particular
levels of drought; however, the agricultural use for food production is deemed
"essential" and is not subject to that regulation.174 The Act does create a
preference among essential uses as follows: "Water used to maintain minimum
water levels in the potable drinking water supply and water used for public
safety purposes have the highest priority in the essential water category." 7 5
That same section provides a series of criteria that are guides for determining the
extent of curtailment of non-essential users.
It would be helpful if the same
guidance were applicable to non-preferred essential uses, which would include
agricultural uses. The benefits of announced standards and pre-drawn plans are

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that the burden of proof according to the statute is properly
placed on the applicant rather than the state).
169. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-20(14), (15) (Supp. 2014).
170. Id § 4-23-20(a).
171. Id § 49-23-70(C). The promulgation of regulations is not mandatory, but the importance
of having such a response plan in place should be sufficient to ensure regulations will be
promulgated.
172. Id §§49-23-10 to -100 (2008).
173. Id § 4-23-20(a).
174. Id § 49-23-70(C). The promulgation of regulations is not mandatory, but the importance
of having such a response plan in place should be sufficient to ensure regulations will be
promulgated.
175. Id
176. Id
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that those affected, the water users, can rely upon the plan when structuring their
affairs in times of water shortage. 7 7
From a long-term view, South Carolina's water law has taken an important
step away from the indeterminacy and reactive aspects of common law
riparianism and moved toward a proactive regulatory system based on the
sharing of the water that has long held sway under common law riparianism.
That part is good. The treatment of agricultural use as a form of registered water
use, outside of the regulatory scheme, abuses the well-founded concept of
putting very small uses in a separate statutory category that requires only
reporting. That part is not good. The manner in which it has been done deprives
the state of an essential attribute of its sovereignty over its trust resources. The
state must rectify that error. South Carolina can also make additional
improvements to its new statute and water governance that together with water
resource availability far greater than that of many sister states will position it to
have one of the nation's better water futures.

177. See, e.g., Abrams, New Cooperative Federalism,supranote 30, at 10,461.
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